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On September 11, 2001 (9/11), four hijacked airliners crashed into the 
twin towers of New York’s World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in a field 
southeast of Pittsburg. Among the 19 hijackers were 15 Saudi citizens, and at 
least 2 of the others had family ties to Saudi Arabia. This thesis will examine who 
the hijackers were, and present evidence to support the hypothesis that they 
were specifically selected by al-Qa’ida because of their Saudi citizenship and 
connection to Saudi Arabia.  The selection of these young men served certain 
specific political purposes for the al-Qa’ida terror network, even though these 
purposes were not known to some of the hijackers.  
The resulting conclusions are of particular importance, because they can 
contribute to the threat assessment analyses conducted by the United States. 
That is, the presence or absence of Saudi Arabia based terrorist activities has an 
effect on what the United States policy towards Saudi Arabia should be. The fact 
that the United States shares a special relationship with Saudi Arabia contributes 
to the significance of this examination. The U.S. - Saudi relationship is based on 
several common interests. Saudi Arabia provides an important portion of the 
world’s oil and is the most influential member of OPEC. Saudi Arabia is needed 
as a coalition partner to ensure U.S. interests in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is 
dependent on U.S. protection against external threats. In the war on terrorism, 
Saudi Arabia’s monarchy faces the same threat as the United States. 
Since the emergence of the Gulf War coalition (and even more so since 
9/11), several sources of friction have been troubling the U.S – Saudi relations. 
Because it is a Sultanistic regime,1 Saudi society lacks in political and civil rights, 
religious freedom and transparency in the justice system. The Saudis are 
abusing their influence in OPEC through the self-interested dictation of oil prices. 
There is a strong anti-Semitism within Saudi society, which contributes to the 
funding of Palestinian militancy by Saudi citizens. Saudi Arabia is attempting to 
                                            
1 
1 Linz, J. J. (2002). Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rennier Publishers. 
procure weapons of mass destruction. The Saudi cooperation in the 9/11 
investigations is questionable. Guided by a strict Wahhabi-interpreted Islam, 
Saudis feel obligated to support efforts to protect the Muslim world. This 
obligation is an easy target to be exploited by extremists. These sources of 
friction lead to a discussion on the U.S. policy towards Saudi Arabia.  
 Therefore, U.S. politicians and the U.S. public critique Saudi Arabia’s 
domestic policy. The critique is based on the “sources of friction” and reinforced 
by the “15-out-of-19” argument.  
Walter Laqueur warns: “Terrorism is dangerous ground for simplificateurs 
and generalisateurs. To approach it, a cool head is probably more essential than 
any other intellectual quality.”2 Such warnings as given by Laqueur should also 
be applied when considering the term “Islamic fundamentalism.” Similar to 
Laqueur’s warning about how to approach terrorism and the danger of easily 
dismissing terrorists as psychopaths or fanatics, the term Islamic fundamentalism 
is equally problematic. Islamic fundamentalists are reduced to the militant 
Muslims, the so-called “bomb throwers”. In reality, Islamic fundamentalism 
includes a whole spectrum of Muslims, from those who strictly practice a pure 
form of Islam over political Islam, therefore promoting Islam as a concept for all 
branches of a society; to those Muslims who believe that it is God’s will to fight 
the enemies of Islam by any and all means, including the use of force and 
killing.3 It is amongst the later group, which represent only a small percentage of 
Islamic fundamentalists, where Islamic terrorists can be found. Thus, it is an error 
to treat Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism as synonyms. Often times, the 
term “radical Islam” in this context is used, but since this term is also easily 
misunderstood, it will be avoided in this paper.  
Even after overcoming these difficulties in terminology, it nevertheless 
remains difficult to come to an agreement on the precise definition of “Islamic 
terrorism.” This difficulty arises primarily because there is not a precise and 
                                            
2 Kegley, C. W. (2003). The New Global Terrorism – Characteristics, Causes, Controls (p. 1). 
New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc. 
3 Robinson, Glenn E. (2002, October). Lecture: Islamic Fundamentalism: Theory and 
Practice. United States Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
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universally accepted definition of terrorism in general. After presenting various 
definitions of terrorism provided in the literature, this chapter will select a 
definition which best describes the form of international Islamic terrorism that the 
al-Qa’ida network is practicing and which had its peak in the attacks of 9/11. 
The RAND Corporation defines terrorism as, “violence or the threat of 
violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm, generally in 
support of political or systemic objectives.”4 Analogous to how Rex Hudson 
defines a terrorist action, a terrorist is a clandestine member of a sub-national 
group or a clandestine agent, who executes the calculated use of unexpected, 
shocking, and unlawful violence against noncombatants (including, in addition to 
civilians, off-duty military and security personnel in peaceful situations) and other 
symbolic targets, for the psychological purpose of publicizing a political or 
religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a government or civilian 
population into accepting demands on behalf of the terrorist’s cause.5  
The Federal Research Division defines terrorism as the calculated use of 
unexpected, shocking, and unlawful violence against noncombatants (including, 
in addition to civilians, off-duty military and security personnel in peaceful 
situations) and other symbolic targets perpetrated by a clandestine member(s) of 
a sub national group or a clandestine agent for the psychological purpose of 
publicizing a political or religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a 
government(s) or civilian population into accepting demands on behalf of the 
cause.6 
The U.S. Department of State (1998) defines terrorism as "premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub 
national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an 
audience."7 
                                            
4 Lesser, I. O., & Hoffman, B., & Arquilla, J., & Ronfeldt, D., & Zanini, M (1999). Countering 
the New Terrorism, (p. 85). Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 
5 Hudson, R. A. (2003). The Sociology an Psychology of Terrorism: Who becomes a Terrorist 
and Why? (p. 10). Retrieved February 17, 2003, from Federal Research Division Web Site: 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Sociology-Psychology%20of%20Terrorism.htm . 
6 Hudson, R. A., (p. 138).  
7 Hudson, R. A., (p. 10).  
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Other definitions range from “terrorism consists of acts that in themselves 
may be classic forms of crime - murder, arson, the use of explosives – but that 
differ from classic crimes in that they are executed with the deliberate intention of 
causing panic, disorder, and terror within an organized society;”8 to “terrorism is 
war conducted outside the construct of nation-states; it is more than simple 
destructiveness, it creates fear and all its associated side effects”9. 
The above definitions vary in their emphasis on certain characteristics of 
terrorism or terrorists. But they also have certain commonalities. Terrorism is not 
just violence against governments or people, but the way it is executed has a 
psychological dimension to it. It creates fear, it intimidates, and generally it has 
objectives beyond the obvious killing or destruction. 
The Central Intelligence Agency distinguishes between international and 
transnational terrorism (international being terrorism carried out by individuals or 
groups controlled by a sovereign state and transnational terrorism being 
terrorism carried out by autonomous non-state actors). The term international 
terrorism is used here to refer to any act of terrorism affecting the national 
interests of more than one country. The WTC bombing, for example, was an act 
of international terrorism because its perpetrators included foreign nationals.10 
Edward Mickolus, in Trends in International Terrorism, makes a similar 
distinction.11 According to his categorization, the correct term for describing the 
form of terrorism which occurred on September 11, 2001, is “transnational 
terrorism”. Mickolus distinguishes according to whether nationals of more than 
one state are involved and whether terrorists’ activities are controlled or directed 
by governments. Four categories are described: a) international terrorism 
(different nationalities involved, government controlled); b) state terrorism (no 
different nationalities, government controlled); c) domestic terrorism (no different 
                                            
8 Kegley, C. W., (p. 16).  
9 Howell, L. D. (2003). Is the New Global Terrorism a Clash of Civilization? Evaluating 
Terrorism’s Multiple Sources (pp. 173 – 174). In: Kegley, C. W. (2003). 
10 Hudson, R. A., (p. 136). 
11 Mickolus, E. (1978). Trends in International Terrorism (p. 45). In: Livingston, M.H., & 
Kress, L.B., & Wanek, M.G. (Eds.). (1978). International Terrorism in the Contemporary World. 
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
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nationalities, not government controlled); and d) transnational terrorism (different 
nationalities, not government controlled).12 Mickolus’ categorization uses correct 
and precise terms and the term “transnational terrorism” best describes the 
occurrences of 9/11.  However, although the distinctions provided by Mickolus 
are very good in theory, in practice it is often times much more difficult to 
distinguish the difference. For example, in the Lockerbie airliner bombing, it was 
never really clear whether the attacks were government controlled or not. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, the commonly known term 
“international Islamic terrorism” will be used.  
When the term international Islamic terrorism is used, the category of 
global terrorism will purposively be omitted. When the latter is used in the context 
of international Islamic terrorism, it is deceiving. It implies that this form of 
terrorism not only has global reach, but is a phenomenon of globalization, not 
directed specifically against certain targets. But reality shows that international 
Islamic terrorism is aimed against Western influence in Muslim lands and against 
those who support Western influence. Therefore, this paper will not refer to 
Islamic terrorism as global terrorism, even if it is carried out in a global theatre. 
Characteristic differences between Islamic terrorism (or religiously 
motivated terrorism in general) and forms of secular terrorism are the value 
system, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and 
the Manichean world view13 of “holy terrorists”.14 For religious terrorists, violence 
is a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to a demand from 
                                            
12 Mickolus, E., (p. 45). 
13 Manichean world view was named after the founder of an ancient Persian religion, Mani 
(about 216 – 276 AD). Its philosophy is that the universe was strictly divided into the “good“ 
kingdom, which was ruled by God, and the “evil” kingdom, which was ruled by Satan. In a 
universal catastrophe, the two kingdoms became mixed and since that time have fought each 
other. Through this fight, man was created. His body consisted of matter and represented the evil 
kingdom and his soul was an image of God’s light, which is captured inside the evil body. Freeing 
the soul from the body is mankind’s highest goal. When the human soul overcomes temptation, it 
can enter God’s kingdom. 
14 Secular terrorists groups, like the Argentine Montoneros, the Italian Red Brigades, or the 
German Baader-Meinhof Gang, as described in Maria Jose Moyano’s Argentina’s Lost Patrol, 
(New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1995), all had a Manichean world view. But in 
the case of Islamic terrorists groups, the Manichean idealism is adopted in a literal sense and 
therefore more extreme. 
5 
God.15 One major difference in terrorists’ philosophies became obvious through 
the attacks of September 11, 2001. It seems that these terrorists wanted more 
than the attention gained from scores of people from around the world watching 
their deeds, and more than just the ability to coerce changes in the enemy’s 
policy. These terrorists wanted, in addition, to kill as many enemies as 
possible.16 The pressure for the targeted government was no longer just an 
indirect pressure from public opinion or foreign governments to deal with 
terrorist’s issues, but became more direct through an assault on thousands of 
people, a number which surpassed the number of casualties resulting from the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. 
There are many contrary explanations for who are the supporters of 
Islamic terrorism, and how Islamic terrorists are recruited. As for fundamental 
Islam in Middle Eastern states- it ranges from a religious minority with no chance 
of influencing the state’s policy or gaining control over the state, to a broad 
development towards Islamic fundamentalism and a radical approach against the 
West and any Western influence and modernization in Middle East states. As for 
public support of Islamic terrorism- it ranges from devout support, coming from 
the handful of troubled individuals who, after experiencing personal 
disappointment with the West became devoutly religious and perhaps even 
terrorists, to the less extreme support, coming from the common Muslim, who 
happens to sympathize with bin Laden and his ideas. Even the later individual, 
since he often tends to agree with bin Laden’s cause, can be recruited to support 
terrorism and terrorists or to become an Islamic terrorist himself. 
The 19 hijackers of the 9/11 attacks were all Muslims from Arab states. 15 
of those 19 were Saudi citizens. A question which needs to be addressed is, 
whether there is significance to this fact or whether it is simply a coincidence. In 
order to first provide a basis for the evaluation of the hijackers’ motives and the 
context for the 9/11 attacks, in Chapter II, the conventional wisdom about Islamic 
terrorism will be laid out and in Chapter III, the events and the objectives of 9/11 
                                            
15 Hoffman, B. (1993). Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious 
Imperative (p. 2). Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 
16 Kegley, C. W., (p. 2). 
6 
will be described. Also in Chapter III, the available biographical and sociological 
data of all of the 9/11 hijackers will be displayed and interpreted. Finally, the 
conclusion (Chapter IV) will present the argument that the terror acts, in which 
the 15 Saudis participated in, did not fit their original motives for joining militant 
Islam. Furthermore, these Saudi citizens were deliberately selected by al-Qa’ida 
for certain pragmatic and political reasons. That is, the selection of these Saudi 
citizens was not just random or haphazard but rather deliberate in order to fulfill 
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II. MILITANT ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC 
TERRORISM 
A. INTRODUCTION  
All three monotheistic religions, Christendom, Judaism and Islam, have 
experienced violent forms or periods in their history. In recent history, all three 
have also experienced tendencies towards fundamentalism. It is within Islam, 
though, that this religious fundamentalism exhibits an especially violent form.17 
An attempt to generalize characteristics of religious terrorism has been 
made by Waldmann.18 He describes characteristics which are relevant and 
common to religious terrorism. According to his analysis, religious terrorism is 
driven by an extraordinary motivation of remarkable strength, which can, in the 
extreme case, lead to a collective suicide. A connection between religious and 
political goals is often observed (especially in cases of quasi colonial situations). 
The terrorists will even strike against weak and moderate members of their own 
faith, those who are heretics or accused of betrayal. In addition, they deliberately 
violate religious rules and taboos, in order to draw attention of the people to the 
religious crisis situation. They target particular locations or times and use ritual 
weapons.19 
In addition to the explanations of religious terrorism, the emergence of 
Islamism and the history of Islamic terrorism, the distinction must be made 
between Islamic terrorism and international Islamic terrorism. The classical 
Islamic terrorist directed his actions against his own government; for example, 
the terrorists in Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, and thus, this terrorism was 
kept regional. International Islamic terrorism, on the other hand, is not only 
directed against the government of the terrorist group, but also has a global 
reach.  Furthermore, because of the variety of forms and branches of Islamic 
                                            
17 Waldmann, P. (1998). Terrorismus – Provokation der Macht (p. 99). Muenchen, Germany: 
Gerling-Akad.-Verlag. 
18 Waldmann, P., (p. 103). 
19 Waldmann, P., (p. 103). 
9 
terrorism and, its variety of goals and means, it is imprecise and unfavorable to 
generalize Islamic terrorism. In contrast, the younger phenomenon of 
international Islamic terrorism has certain commonalities in goals, targets, and 
means. Since the 9/11 attacks are a manifestation of this phenomenon, the 
concern of this paper is the new international Islamic terrorism. 
 
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF MILITANT ISLAM 
Militant Islam is not a “recent” phenomenon, but in its extreme form, has 
recently developed into a movement of international reach and goals, like 
punishment of “infidel oppressor states” and it strives for a global pure Islamic 
society. 
After the end of colonialism, most Middle Eastern states moved through 
different political periods, ranging from Arab nationalism, through capitalism, 
communism/socialism, Westernization, or mixtures of the above. However, none 
of these political periods provided the desired betterment for Middle Eastern 
states, and therefore all failed. Islamic fundamentalism is offering another way to 
success. Nevertheless, the “artificially” drawn state borders in the Middle East 
and the resulting Arab nationalism have been, in some ways, beneficial 
developments. States have been formed and more or less national identities 
have emerged, which will make it unlikely that these borders will ever be 
drastically changed.  Furthermore, the developed national identities are in stark 
contrast to Islamic ideology, which questions the legitimacy of national borders 
and governments.  
The slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood20, "Islam is the solution", has 
become a philosophy for Islamic fundamentalists. Like the Iranian revolutionary 
leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, Islamic fundamentalists also question the legitimacy 
                                            
20 The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hasan Al-Bana, an Egyptian teacher. It 
was a secret religious organization, which was dedicated to the creation of an Islamic state in 
Egypt. During Nasser’s rule in Egypt in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the Muslim Brotherhood was 
banned, but it successively gained a quasi-legal status during the presidency of Nasser’s 
successor, Anwar Sadat, and was allowed to establish branches in schools and universities and 
to perform welfare services for the poor in Egypt’s slums. Today many members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood are jailed and the Muslim Brotherhood is still banned from direct political 
participation and officially not represented in Egypt’s parliament. However, several Egyptian 
opposition parties are infiltrated or even dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. 
10 
of almost all contemporary Middle Eastern governments. The argument is made 
that no government in the Middle East, except the Iranian21, is legitimate, 
because their rule deviates from the Islamic political doctrine, which requires 
from the rulers authority and welfare for the people. Most Middle Eastern 
governments emphasize authority only and are known to be corrupt and practice 
nepotism. Especially in the case of cooperation with Western powers, these 
governments are accused of taking advantage of and exploiting the people. 
Therefore, Islamic terrorism is not only directed against the West, but also 
against Middle Eastern governments. Since in most Middle Eastern states, the 
security apparatus of the rulers is well developed, sophisticated and highly 
effective; terrorists have a greater chance of success when targeting the “infidel 
aids” and “foreign oppressors”, than their own regimes.  In addition, such actions 
against foreign enemies are more likely to be perceived as just.  
In the case of Islamic fundamentalism, there are two motives for religious 
terrorism. First, the defense against global modernization and secularism and 
second, the return to a society based solely on religious grounds, and the 
protection of such a society.22 Islamists view the time period of the prophet 
Mohammad and the first four caliphs as exemplary of the ideal society. 
Therefore, Muslims are encouraged to strive for the pure Islam of this time 
period.23 The desired end state for any Muslim state should be the unity of 
politics and religion with the Shari’ah (Islamic law) as the legal body and 
guideline for the entire society. 
  
C. INTERNATIONAL MILITANT ISLAM 
Different from the state-sponsored (mainly by Egypt) emergence of the 
PLO as an ethno-nationalist terrorist organization in the 1950’s24, the attacks of 
                                            
21 The Iranian political system is accepted by the Iranian people and it represents the closest 
thing to a democracy in the Middle East (except Israel). The Sharia is implemented and 
dominates all factions of society. Although voices calling for reforms are becoming louder in Iran, 
the Islamic clerics are still in full control of the state. 
22 Waldmann, P., (pp. 103 – 104). 
23 Waldmann, P., (p. 104). 
24 Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside Terrorism (pp. 75 – 79). New York: Columbia University Press.  
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9/11 were not sponsored by any state in order to fight another state, but carried 
out by Islamic fundamentalists, who oppose the ever-increasing presence of 
Western states in the Middle East and who oppose contemporary Arab regimes, 
whom they feel lack legitimacy. It was not another state which was fought, but 
the attacks were meant to be punishment for those people who are responsible 
for the misery of the Middle East25, and they were supposed to enforce the end 
of the Western presence in the Middle East. In that way, Islamic states would be 
able to go back to the pure Islam as the solution for betterment. 
Palestinian terrorism in the 1970’s was meant to catch the world’s 
attention.26 The hostage-taking of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic 
Games by the Palestine “Black September” was not just meant to pressure the 
release of imprisoned comrades from Israeli prisons, but also aimed to acquire 
the world’s attention for the Palestinian situation. Whereas the release of 
prisoners was not accomplished, the latter goal for attention worked perfectly, 
since the world’s press was gathered at Munich for the Olympics. The hostage-
taking drew the press’s attention away from the Olympics to the Palestinian 
issue. The massive press apparatus already set up at the scene worked perfectly 
for the terrorists’ cause. 
Although the events of 9/11 received a level of attention greater than any 
other past terrorist action, contemporary Islamic international terrorism is 
generally not aimed to get attention for the terrorists’ cause, but simply meant to 
put an end to infidel presence on Islamic lands (to gain “real” independence) and 
to punish those who are responsible for the miseries of Middle Eastern states, as 
announced in Osama bin Laden’s fatwa27 in 1998.28 
                                            
25 This accusation is not limited to foreign (Western) powers. Contemporary regimes in the 
Middle East are as well responsible for the country’s situation and, in many cases, lack legitimacy 
in the eyes of Islamic fundamentalists. 
 
26 Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside Terrorism (pp. 70 – 71).  
27 A fatwa is a legal opinion based on the holy texts of Islam, in answer to a question about a 
precise case. Among Islamic scholars, Osama bin Laden is not considered to be eligible to order 
fatwas. Nevertheless Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa, stating that it is every Muslim’s duty to kill 
any American wherever the chance would permit. 
28 Bin Laden, O. (1998). Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders. Retrieved March 20, 2003, from 
Cornell University Library Web Site: http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/wif.htm . 
12 
Although probably not a primary objective, the 9/11 attacks did have a 
large propagandistic effect. Similar to how the Black September’s hostage-taking 
at the Munich Olympics led to thousands of Palestinians joining terrorist 
organizations29, the “heroic victory” over the “Great Satan” on September 11 has 
contributed to the popularity in Arab Middle Eastern states of Osama bin Laden 
and al-Qa’ida. About 95% of Saudi Arabia’s male population between the ages of 
25 and 41 have sympathy for Osama bin Laden30. 
There is one major difference between these two attacks. Munich 1972 
caused the Palestinian issue to be noticed and acknowledged by the world 
community, resulting in such acts as the 1974 invitation to the PLO leader, Yassir 
Arafat, to address the United Nation’s General Assembly and the granting of the 
special observer status of PLO in the General Assembly.31 In contrast, the 9/11 
attacks, although they received a great amount of publicity, did not open a 
diplomatic forum for Islamists. The conversion of publicity into political 
achievement, like in the PLO’s case, did not work for al-Qa’ida. In fact, 9/11 
resulted in the opposite effect; because of the magnitude of the attacks and the 
large number of casualties, the attacks were world-wide condemned. Instead, it 
caused the war on Afghanistan, January 2002, which was also meant to send a 
clear signal to the world that anybody who supports terrorism will be fought, if 
necessary, by ultimate means. 
The PLO was the first truly international terrorist organization and by 
training personnel of foreign terrorist organizations (groups which did not 
necessarily share common goals), it also embraced a far more international 
orientation than other terrorist organizations of the 1970’s and 1980’s.32 The PLO 
even accumulated funding by training terrorists from foreign organizations in 
camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Yemen, among other places, for $5,000 to 
                                            
29 Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside Terrorism, (p. 74).  
30 Woolsey, James; Figures cited by Woolsey in a testimony before the House International 
Relations Committee, May 22nd,  2002. 
31 Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside Terrorism, (p. 75). 
32 Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside Terrorism, (p. 74). 
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$10,000, per participant.33 Al-Qa’ida had its “real life” training camp in 
Afghanistan, fighting the Soviets, and later a safe haven in the Taliban 
Afghanistan. 
Religious terrorism, and in particular, the new international Islamic 
terrorism, is exceptionally dangerous and more lethal for a variety of reasons. 
First is the creation of a radically different value system, with mechanisms of 
legitimization, justification, and morality, which is derived from fundamentalist 
ideologues or terrorist leaders’ interpretation of the faith. “For the religious 
terrorist, violence is a sacramental act or divine duty, executed in direct response 
to some theological demand or imperative and justified by scripture. Religion 
therefore functions as a legitimizing force, specially sanctioning wide-scale 
violence against an almost open-ended category of opponents.”34 Waldmann 
interprets the influence of clerics in the doctrinal process of Islamic terrorism as a 
regulating factor, which limits this form of terrorism and makes it predictable.35 
However, the influence of clerics in this aspect is overstated. Although clerics do 
have the tools for and do participate in creating a broad support among common 
believers, the causal connection for the justification of terrorism does not exist. It 
is, rather, the radical Islamic fundamentalists who reinterpret the word of Allah in 
a way which justifies terrorist activities, but is still understandable and acceptable 
by the common Muslim. Therefore, clerics do not directly cause terrorism, but 
they can provide a broad basis for recruitment of Islamic terrorists, through their 
abilities to influence the mindset of believers, which then become more easily 
adaptable to militant Islam. But since clerics are not generally leaders of militant 
Islam, they have little, if any influence on the actual execution, or even on the 
prevention (regulation) of terror acts. 
 Hoffman feels that clerics have essentially no control over Islamic 
terrorism, which will become more and more lethal and less restricted. Terrorists 
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see the need for more spectacular actions in order to get attention, which is best 
acquired through a high number of casualties. Terrorists profit from former 
experience, as well as better and more easily accessible weapons. Since 
Western powers become more and more dominant, the impotence of some 
Middle Eastern states tempts them to support terrorism in order to accomplish 
their political objectives. Unable to achieve their unrealistic goals by 
conventional/political means, international terrorists attempt to send an 
ideological or religious message by terrorizing the general public. Through the 
choice of their targets, which are often symbolic or representative of the targeted 
nation, terrorists attempt to create a high-profile impact on the public. In doing so, 
they hope to demonstrate various points, such as that the targeted government 
cannot protect its own citizens, or that by assassinating a specific victim, they 
can teach the general public a lesson about espousing viewpoints or policies 
antithetical to their own. For example, by assassinating Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981, a year after his historic trip to Jerusalem, the 
al-Jihad terrorists had hoped to convey to the world, and especially to Muslims, 
the error that he represented.36 
 Radical interpretations of religion and the demand of being the one and 
only religion create broad support, justification and motives for terrorism. The 
recent tendency of not claiming the credit for the terror acts also increases the 
lethality, because the terrorist does not have to openly admit to the responsibility 
for the death of the victims.37 Today’s terrorism is increasingly determined by two 
connected aspects: first, there are growing numbers of religiously-motivated 
amateurs, who seek heavenly rewards and express their grievance through terror 
acts; and second, there is the deliberate exploitation of these amateurs by 
professional terrorists38 and/or state sponsors.  
Sayyid Qutb was one of the most influential ideologues of revolutionary 
Islam. In 1964 he published his work, “Milestones”, in his homeland Egypt, in 
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which he proposed radical demands (for which he was ultimately hanged, in 
1966). Qutb proposed that Muslims have to free themselves from the clutches of 
jahili39 society, jahil concepts, jahili traditions and jahil leadership.40 
Fundamentalists like Qutb rejected any compromise whatsoever. He also 
revealed one of the essential basics of Islamic fundamentalism - to accept the 
Shari’ah without any question and reject all other laws.41 The later is especially 
important to Islamic terrorism, because it provides justification for any terrorist 
action, as long as the terrorist is convinced that he executes Allah’s will. Even 
failure of achievement or counterproductive terrorist actions will not lead to an 
end of Islamic terrorism, because ultimate victory is certain, since it is God’s war, 
not the terrorists’.42  
But what makes Islamic terrorism so much more dangerous than forms of 
secular terrorism? According to Hoffman, there are basically three key 
differences, which more or less contribute to the higher menace of religious 
terrorism.43 First, it rejects all contemporary ideologies, and therefore, does not 
have to compete with other ideologies or does not have to justify itself in front of 
other societal systems. Second, it is conceived from Allah and conducted 
according to Allah’s will, and therefore, it will only end when total victory has 
been achieved. Third, it is the duty of every individual Muslim, as well as the 
collective task of the Muslim community, to fight the enemy of Allah. It is the 
enemy’s choice, whether he will convert to Islam or be put to death.44 These 
characteristics make Islamic terrorism more persistent and more consequent 
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than secular terrorism, since its dogma does not allow any compromise, whereas 
in other forms of terrorism, compromise is, to a higher or lesser degree, an 
option. 
The higher lethality of Islamic terrorism versus secular terrorism is another 
aspect which makes it more dangerous. In the history of terrorism, it has seldom 
been an objective to kill as many people as possible, because the rationale has 
always been that there is no need to kill many, if the objective can be reached be 
killing only a few.45 This rationale is still pertinent to most secular terrorists, but, 
like the attacks of 9/11, and bin Laden’s fatwa46 prove, this rationale is missing 
from the new international Islamic terrorism. 
The concept of suicide assassins has been a part of Islamic terrorism’s 
doctrine since the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism. The 
Muslim Brotherhood’s slogan “Allah is its goal, the Prophet is the model, the 
Qur’an its constitution, jihad its path, and death for the sake of Allah" its most 
sublime belief”47 supports the concept of suicide assassins. Since fundamentalist 
interpret jihad, the holy war, as a personal struggle for Islam, in which the 
sacrifice of one’s own life is the ultimate commitment a Muslim can give, Islamic 
terrorists can easily recruit suicide bombers for their missions. In particular, 
motivation for the potential suicide bomber comes from the conviction that, if 
successful, he will receive most desirable rewards in paradise. This motivates the 
terrorist for his personal sake, which can be an even higher incentive than the 
goals of his organization. A suicidal attack can be conducted in a most precise 
and efficient way, because the terrorist can solely concentrate on his mission, 
without having to worry about his own safety. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult 
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to prevent a suicide attack. In addition to the primary effect of the mission, 
namely destruction and killing, the secondary effect is a great deal of respect 
among fundamental Muslims resulting from the sacrifice of one’s own life for the 
sake of Islam.48 
This latter effect, earning respect through making the ultimate sacrifice, is 
another major characteristic, which distinguishes Islamic terrorism from most 
other forms of terrorism outside the Islamic world. Martha Crenshaw states that 
terrorists can only trust each other, and that the nature of their commitment cuts 
them off from society.49 However, being cut from society does not necessarily 
apply to the Islamic terrorist. Unlike secular terrorists, who may have a handful of 
admirers inside their societies, Islamic terrorists have the chance of receiving 
broader support, since in Arab societies, Islam is much more present and 
powerful than any religion in Western states. Understanding for Islamic terrorists 
might be present in a Muslim society, as people in this society might believe that 
the terrorist fights for the Muslim cause. In the Palestinian society, for example, 
suicide assassins are glorified and enjoy a great reputation. Rock bands sing 
about their heroic deeds and little children collect pictures of the suicide 
assassins (and the families of the deceased suicide assassin receive monetary 
aid).50 Additional prominent examples are the 1993 World Trade Center bomber, 
Ramzi Yousef, who gained hero status among wide parts of Pakistani society, 
when he hid in Pakistan after the bombing; and Osama bin Laden, whose first 
name became the most popular for newborn males in the Arab world, and whom 
the majority of the male Saudi population has sympathy for.  
Whereas the socialistic “religion” of the Rote Armee Fraktion, the Red 
Brigades, and other leftist terrorist organizations did not work for the majority of 
Europe’s peoples, bin Laden’s radical interpretation of Islam and the exploitation 
of what many see as their Muslim duties seems to work. And it only works in an 
environment of a religion, which demands unquestionable obedience of its 
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believers and therefore creates a population, which is potentially adaptive to 
radical dogma. Therefore, although Juergensmeyer’s contention that Osama bin 
Laden is not more representative of Islam than Timothy McVeigh is of 
Christianity, or Japan’s Shoko Asahara is of Buddhism51 is still true; there is, 
nevertheless, a major difference in the level of acceptance of these individuals 
inside their communities compared to bin Laden. There exists very little 
sympathy for Timothy McVeigh among Americans, or for Shoko Asahara among 
Buddhists52, but in contrast, Osama bin Laden is well respected and his cause 
has a lot of sympathy among a much broader range of Arab Muslims. 
Additionally, Islamic terrorism is seeking (successfully) its support from the 
economical frustration which exists in wide parts of the Middle East. Even for a 
rich state, like Saudi Arabia, it becomes more and more difficult to co-opt its 
people by basically a “state-provided life”. This difficulty arises because oil 
revenues stagnate, while the population grows rapidly; which produces 
increasing socio-economic grievances. Like the Middle East suffered directly 
from Western influence during and shortly after colonial times, now the Middle 
East suffers from an indirect imperialism. Western economic and military 
intervention is widely understood as an “invasion” that undermines local and 
regional autonomy, divides and conquers people, generates massive political 
corruption, disrupts long-established patterns of social interaction, and bombards 
local communities with material and cultural imports that challenge traditional 
religious values and threatens people’s core identities.53 This situation fuels at 
least an understanding, if not support for the Islamic terrorist’s causes. The 
Western influence, the domination of the Middle East by Western powers, and 
the resulting frustration of Middle Eastern societies over their inabilities to 
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counteract the West, also explains why Islamic terrorism became international 
and of global reach. 
The new Islamic terrorism can be interpreted as both a manifestation of 
the globalization process (like other phenomena, terrorism also becomes global) 
and a response to globalization of the world economy (which indeed means 
impacting the whole globe, but directed by the West) and widely perceived U.S. 
hegemony (which is mainly true for the world’s economy, but entirely true 
politically and militarily).54 Herein has Islamic terrorism a major justification, since 
it is beyond doubt evil and unacceptable that infidels dominate true believers55. 
In fact, this is a concept which is crucial to the functioning of al-Qa’ida. In order to 
recruit operatives and fund money for operations, al-Qa’ida needs Islamic 
communities to share its fundamental vision; al-Qa’ida needs sympathetic 
governments or religious bodies to provide shelter and logistical support.56 In this 
aspect, the attacks of 9/11 proved to be counterproductive, since the aftershock 
produced a lot of sympathy and support for the United States in their effort to 
fight terrorism. 
However, the Islamic faith, the way it is practiced in many Arab states, 
provides a broad basis of believers, who are raised to absolute and strict 
obedience of Islamic rules. This effect provides a broad mass of individuals who, 
can easily be exploited by extremists. Therefore the struggle to fight Islamic 
terrorist organizations and governments which support terrorism seems futile, as 
long as the religious, ideological, and political propaganda of Islamic 
fundamentalism are not stopped. This requires not only a long time, but also 
major changes in the interpretation of the Islamic religion in order to make it 
resistant to the misinterpretations of extremists. The implementation of changes 
in the interpretation of Islam would stand in stark contrast to recent developments 
in the Muslim world. Rather than implementing reforms, in order to meet 
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contemporary needs of the community, the tendency is backwards, to the “pure” 
Islam of the times of the prophet Mohammad. Therefore, it seems extremely 
unlikely, if not impossible, that Muslim communities will, in the near future, 
incorporate essential changes. 
 
D. THE INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC TERRORIST 
To provide a general profile of terrorists is difficult to accomplish and, 
facing the variety of different terrorist organizations and the variety of their 
motives and goals, a generalization can never be precise. Nevertheless, Charles 
A. Russell and Bowman H. Miller have attempted to draw a profile of the 
“average” terrorist. They examined data from 18 terrorist organizations of the 
Middle East, Europe, Latin America, and Japan and came to the conclusion that 
the majority of the examined terrorists fit the following profile: single male, 
between the ages of 22-24 with a university education (some held a university 
degree). Any female terrorists generally held only supporting functions (except in 
West Germany). The majority came from upper-middle-class families and grew 
up in urban environments. The older terrorists had professions in the medical or 
legal fields, were engineers or teachers, as were their parents. Independent of 
whether they became terrorists during university times or afterwards, their first 
contact to a terrorist organization was made during university times.57 
Although the Russell/Miller analysis tends to generalize, it nevertheless 
provides a few arguments, which can be useful in analyzing the Islamic terrorists 
groups, like the case of the 15 Saudis. For example, note that Russell and Miller 
found that initial contact is generally made with young people, immature adults 
who are in stages in their lives, where they have left the protection of their 
childhood environments, but are not yet quite independent or established in their 
professional lives. In this stage in life, young people are receptive to new ideas, 
new paths in life, or new opportunities for their further development. In this stage, 
young people may even be susceptive to being recruited by a terrorist 
organization.  
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For Islamic terror organizations, there are several possibilities for 
recruitment of new operatives and there is no stereotypical social background, 
which matches all Islamic terrorists. There is also a distinction between the 
terrorist elite (masterminds and leaders, the “brains”), and the supporters, 
fighters, and suicide (or potential suicide) attackers (operatives, “foot-soldiers”, 
the “muscle”). Generally, Islamic terrorists at one point in their lives have been 
exposed to oppression by the occupation power (e.g., in the Israel-Palestine 
case) or have experienced and participated in some kind of grievance against the 
“enemies” of Islam. Waldmann describes a possible stereotypical path from 
childhood to terrorist recruit in which, in many cases, the future Palestinian 
terrorist already as a child had expressed a grievance towards the occupiers, for 
example, by throwing rocks at Israeli military vehicles. The potential terrorist 
participated in fights with Israeli settlers; carried out militant action (including 
assassination) against any Palestinians who were believed to collaborate with 
the Israelis; and made trips to training camps in Sudan, Syria, Jordan, or 
Lebanon to be prepared for terrorist activities, in order to return and build-up 
terrorist cells in Palestine.58 
Among terrorists, suicide assassins play a special role. They are naturally 
never the masterminds, because these individuals are simply too valuable. 
Suicide attackers are “foot-soldiers”, generally solely recruited for their deadly 
mission. Therefore, these terrorists need a different psychological preparation. 
Ariel Merari argues that religious terrorist groups appeal to recruits' 
religious piety or patriotic sentiments, but neither fanaticism nor nationalism 
alone are "necessary or sufficient" to foment suicide terrorism. He thinks that the 
key ingredient may be susceptibility to indoctrination. In a recent study of 32 
suicide bombers, Merari found no significant common socioeconomic factors or 
personality traits, such as social dysfunction or suicidal symptoms. But almost all 
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the subjects were young, unattached males. This represents a group which is 
vulnerable to violent organizations in any society.59 
Scott Atran argues that suicide attackers are seldom educationally or 
financially deprived. They are religious, but not fanatic; they have a stable 
environment (fathers, friends, jobs) and, generally do not stick out from the 
masses.60 In a way, suicide attackers are often victims themselves, who are 
selected by organizations or charismatic leaders, trained and sent on a mission. 
The preparation and training is carried out through psychological manipulation 
and drills, which often end in the taping of a “commitment”-video, as a type of 
contract between the potential suicide attacker and the terrorist organization.61 
In the case of a suicide assassin, religious belief plays a much larger role 
than with the “common” Islamic terrorist. According to Islamic belief, suicide is a 
sin, and therefore banned. But what in Western terms is described as “suicide 
assassin”, is, in an Islamist’s mind, someone who is willing to commit himself in 
an ultimate way, hence, to sacrifice his own life to the execution of Allah’s will; 
and therefore, this individual is not committing suicide. According to scholars of 
Muslim culture, so-called suicide bombings are seen by Islamists as instances of 
martyrdom, and should be understood as such. The Arabic term used is istishad, 
a religious term meaning to give one's life in the name of Allah, as opposed to 
intihar, which refers to suicide resulting from personal distress and which is not 
condoned in Islamic teachings.62 
These terrorists are generally young people who are often in a stage of life 
where they have left their parents’ home, but have not yet started their own 
families.  V.J. Hoffman-Ladd has suggested that they are frequently advanced 
students and university graduates in the physical sciences, although often with 
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rural or traditional religious backgrounds.63 They have finished their school 
education (or in some cases, they started but not completed university 
education), finished job training, but have not yet established themselves 
professionally. According to Waldmann, many suicide terrorists studied religion64; 
whereas the general conventional wisdom says that Islamic terrorists are 
generally trained in law, the medical field, science, or engineering, with the later 
dominating.  
In his view of Hoffman-Ladd, Islamic fundamentalism is more of a revolt of 
young people caught between a traditional past and a secular Western 
education.65 R. Euben and Bernard Lewis both argue that there is a cognitive 
collision between Western and fundamentalist worldviews.66 Focusing on Sunni 
fundamentalists, Euben / Lewis suggest that their goals are perceived not as self-
interests but rather as moral imperatives, and that their worldviews differ in 
critical ways from Western worldviews.67 
Although some generalizations can be made about the profile of a 
terrorist, unfortunately, the consensus among terrorism psychologists as well as 
political scientists and sociologists is that there does not appear to be a single 
type of terrorist personality. The personalities of terrorists may be as diverse as 
the personalities of people in any lawful profession. There does not appear to be 
any visibly detectable personality traits that would allow authorities to identify a 
terrorist. Another finding is that the terrorist is not medically diagnosed as 
psychopathic or mentally sick. Contrary to the stereotype that the terrorist is a 
psychopath or otherwise mentally disturbed individual, in reality he is actually 
quite sane, although deluded by an ideological or religious way of viewing the 
world.68 
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What is true for religious terrorists in general, is particularly true for Islamic 
terrorists. The Islamic terrorist sees himself as an individual outside of the 
society, value system, or dogma that he fights against. He rejects and despises 
the system that he fights. This disgust that he feels enables him to conduct 
terrorist operations which are far more destructive and bloody than those of the 
average secular terrorist organization.69 In order to justify his acts of terror, the 
Islamic terrorist does not need the legitimization of his spiritual leaders or his 
religious community. Although his deeds are also motivated by religious ideology, 
ultimately the motivation is self-gratification; as the terrorist (in his eyes), benefits 
from his actions, through his personal salvation and rise to paradise. 
Even if one accepts the notion that a strong belief can motivate an 
individual to overcome the fear of loosing his life, it nevertheless remains difficult 
to comprehend how it is that a young person, with his whole life ahead of him, 
can sacrifice himself. The following example, which shows how Mohammed 
Mansour Jabarah was recruited by al-Qa’ida for the 9/11 attacks, may help to 
illustrate this point, as well as point out the difficulty involved in predicting the 
type of person who has the potential to become an Islamic terrorist. The case of 
Jabarah reveals details on how al-Qa’ida recruits and deploys young operatives. 
Inspired by his older brother and by a boyhood friend who both went to 
Afghanistan in 1999 in order to train to fight in Chechnya, Jabarah resolved to 
become an activist himself. He collected more than $3500 for the Chechen 
rebels from his home in Canada. In the summer of 2000, he visited Kuwait and 
never returned to Canada. Instead, he flew to Pakistan, where he traveled to the 
town of Peshawar. From there, together with a couple of young Saudis (perhaps 
even some of the later hijackers of 9/11), he was escorted to the Afghan town of 
Torkham, where Jabarah met with his older brother, Abdul Rahman Jabarah. 
From Torkham, al-Qa’ida operatives took the brothers to Camp Sheikh Shaheed 
Abu Yahya, an al-Qa’ida training camp about 20 miles north of Kabul. Together 
with other recruits, they attended a tough training program and participated for 
gainst Northern Alliance soldiers who opposed two weeks in fighting a                                            
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Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers. At this point, Jabarah was not chosen to fight in 
Chechnya, but rather to become a bodyguard for Osama bin Laden. He met bin 
Laden four times and also met several senior al-Qa’ida officials and two of the 
9/11 hijackers.70 The path Jabarah took shows how a man, with ambitions to 
contribute to the cause of fellow Muslims in Chechnya, was manipulated by al-
Qa’ida to serve another cause. His mindset and willingness to fight for what was 
in is his eyes a just cause, was recognized by al-Qa’ida operatives, who then 
recruited him for an al-Qa’ida training camp. Once in al-Qa’ida training, he was 
no longer self-determined, but subject to further al-Qa’ida manipulation and 
committed to al-Qa’ida tasking, which could have included ultimately a suicide 
mission. The case of Jabarah illustrates how easy it was for a common young 
man, who had, in his mind, good intentions to serve the Muslim cause, could be 
manipulated into committing acts of terror, acts which had nothing in common 
with his original intentions. 
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III. THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
The following chapter first provides information relevant to the 
understanding of the attacks of September 11, 2001; followed by a detailed study 
on the individual hijackers who were responsible for the attacks. Section A. 
presents the man, Osama bin Laden, his al-Qa’ida network, and the objectives of 
the 9/11 attacks. This is followed, in Section B., by a brief description of the 
actual sequence of events which occurred on that fatal day. Section C. consists 
of a collection of biographical data on each of the participating hijackers; 
organized according to which flight each terrorist was on. In Section D., an 
attempt is made to interpret the biographical data, with the intent of finding 
commonalities in their profiles. Particular emphasis is given to the 15 Saudis-- 
Who were they? What were their backgrounds? What were their motives? 
Finally, Section E. will discuss how these hijackers will fit into the general 
concept of Islamic terrorism. 
   
A. OSAMA BIN LADEN, AL-QA’IDA, AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE 
ATTACKS 
Osama bin Laden’s story begins on July 30, 1957, in Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia, where he was born, the seventeenth son of Mohammad bin Laden, the 
wealthiest construction contractor in Saudi Arabia. Mohammad bin Laden left his 
65 children a financial empire that today is worth an estimated $10 billion. Osama 
was raised in the Hijaz in western Saudi Arabia. He studied management and 
economics in Jiddah. At that time, he was not a fundamental Muslim, but rather 
affiliated with Western lifestyle, which he enjoyed frequently in nightclubs, 
casinos, and bars in Beirut, Lebanon. 
In the early seventies, when his father’s construction company rebuilt the 
holy mosques in Mecca and Medina, he developed a passion for Islam and a 
strong belief in Islamic law. At that time, he adopted the idea of worldwide 
monotheism and the necessity for armed struggle; and in December of 1979, 
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when the Soviet Union invaded Muslim Afghanistan, he dedicated himself to the 
armed struggle against the enemies of Islam. He funded, recruited, transported, 
and trained a volunteer force of Arab nationals to fight Afghan mujahideen. He 
co-founded the Mujahideen Services Bureau and transformed it into an 
international network that recruited Islamic fundamentalists with special 
knowledge, including engineers, medical doctors, terrorists, and drug smugglers. 
In 1989, when the Soviet troops pulled out of Afghanistan, bin Laden 
commanded a fighting force of between 10,000 and 20,000 troops known as 
"Afghan Arabs".71 
 After having been successful as a commander of the “Afghan Arabs” in 
the defeat of the Soviet Union as a occupying power in Afghanistan, bin Laden 
was convinced that he and the “Afghan Arabs” (and later the al-Qa’ida network) 
could take on any enemy standing between them and their goal, the creation of a 
single Islamic state for all Muslims, governed by the Islamic law. 
 It was very disappointing for bin Laden, when in 1991, his offer to the 
Saudi monarchs to help free Kuwait from the invading Iraqi forces was rejected, 
and instead coalition forces, led by the United States, were offered bases in 
Saudi Arabia in order to conduct the war against Iraq. Let down, he moved to 
Sudan, where he established terrorists’ training camps and started supporting 
terrorist groups in various countries. At the same time, many other terrorists 
resided in Sudan; a fact which later helped bin Laden to turn al-Qa’ida into a 
global umbrella organization for Islamic terrorists.72 Even more offensive to bin 
Laden was the fact that U.S. troops stayed in Saudi Arabia, the land of the two 
holiest places of Islam. By 1993, he actively supported Saudi Islamic extremists 
opposing the House of Saud, an action for which, in 1994, he was stripped of his 
Saudi citizenship and by 1996, had to leave Sudan. 
In February of 1998, Osama bin Laden announced the formation of an 
umbrella organization called The Islamic World Front for the Struggle against the 
Jews and the Crusaders (Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyyah al-`Alamiyyah li-Qital al-Yahud 
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wal-Salibiyyin). Among the announced members of this terrorist organization 
were the Egyptian Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah, the Egyptian Al-Jihad, the Egyptian 
Armed Group, the Pakistan Scholars Society, the Partisan Movement for 
Kashmir, the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh, and bin Laden's Afghan military 
wing of the Advice and Reform Commission. Al-Qa’ida is not strictly organized, 
like most other terrorists’ organizations, but rather best described as a financier 
of terrorists’ activities and a loose network of participating Islamic groups. Prior to 
the U.S. invasion, bin Laden, al-Qa’ida leadership and operatives were given 
shelter by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, where al-Qa’ida established training 
camps for their operatives. In turn, bin Laden provided financial support for the 
Taliban and reconstructed Afghan infrastructure. 
One operational goal of al-Qa’ida’s was the liberation of Muslim lands from 
infidels. Although al-Qa’ida carried out a variety of terror acts against “infidel” 
regimes in Muslim states, against their aids, and against infidels who occupied 
Muslim lands; they were never particularly successful in achieving their goals. 
Therefore, the attacks of September 11, 2001, can be interpreted as a 
“desperate attempt to rejuvenate their failing cause, by triggering indiscriminate 
American reactions”73. In addition, the act fulfilled another objective from bin 
Laden’s fatwa, namely to kill as many Americans as possible, wherever it is 
possible74. In his extreme Manichean worldview, bin Laden never did need a 
logical reason for his demands and objectives, because he believed that he had 
a mandate from Allah to punish the "Great Satan."75 In this context, it seems to 
be ironic that the al-Qa’ida network emerged out of the “Afghan Arabs”, the 
mujahideen, who fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and who were 
supported both financially and with weapons by the United States. 
Although this twisted view of bin Laden and his followers falls short of 
explaining the actual attacks of 9/11, it at least it provides an explanation as to 
the willingness of the planners of 9/11 to accept responsibility for the deaths of 
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thousands of people. One conclusion, quickly drawn after the attacks, was that 
the world will never be the same. Sparing the philosophy on whether or not this 
conclusion is indeed true and if so, for whom it may be true;  it cannot be denied 
that certain occurrences which happened (and which are still happening) as a 
result of the attacks would not have occurred, had there never been a 9/11 
attack.  First, Afghanistan would not have been invaded and the Taliban regime 
would most likely still be in place. Second, the war on terrorism, as is presently 
being conducted by the United States (with the support of most of the states of 
the world), would not have begun. And lastly, public life in the United States 
would not have been impacted to such a degree as it is now, by the issues 
surrounding terrorism and the protection from future attacks. 
Since September 11, 2001, the threat of terrorism has become far more 
serious than it has ever before been in the history of the United States.  
Furthermore, it is no longer just a marginal problem for other countries; that is, 
the attacks were an assault on the principles and the political culture not only of 
the United States, but also her allies.76 This was the real target of the 9/11 
attacks, and the objective was the defeat of an infidel system in order to pave the 
way for a worldwide Islamic monotheism. 
 
B. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
On September 11, 2001, four airliners- American Airlines Flights 11 and 
77, and United Airlines Flights 93 and 175- were hijacked shortly after taking-off 
from U.S. east coast airports. The hijackers consisted of two United Emirates 
citizens, one man from Lebanon, one from Egypt, and fifteen Saudi citizens. 
At 08:45 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), United Airlines Flight 11, (a Boeing 
767-200), with 92 people on board, crashed into the north tower of New York’s 
World Trade Center. Eighteen minutes later, another Boeing 767-200, United 
Airlines Flight 175, crashed into the south tower, with 65 people on board. Both 
planes had been fueled for a coast-to-coast flight. The huge amount of fuel set 
both towers quickly on fire. The energy stored in the jet fuel of both planes was 
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the equivalent of 240 tons of dynamite.77 Since this amount of destructive power 
compares to a tactical nuclear weapon (1/4 kiloton), the categorization of the 
airplanes used as weapons of mass destruction is a legitimate one. On an 
average working day, about 50,000 people would have been working inside the 
World Trade Center and about 100,000 tourists would have been visiting. At 
09:20 EDT, firefighters and rescue crew started to fight the fire and evacuate the 
buildings. 
At 09:40 EDT, American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757 carrying 64 
people, crashed into the Pentagon’s west wing in Washington D.C. and caused 
one side of the building to collapse. Immediately after, the White House and the 
Capitol were evacuated and all airports were closed nationwide. 
At 09:50 EDT, the WTC south tower collapsed, 39 minutes later, the north 
tower collapsed as well. 
The fourth hijacked plane, a Boeing 757 United Airlines Flight 93, did not 
make it to its target, either the White House or the Capitol, and crashed at 10:00 
EDT, about 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh. It is believed that some of the 45 
people on board became aware of the hijackers’ plans and rose up against the 
terrorists in order to prevent them from accomplishing their mission. 
The attacks cost the lives of more than 3000 people, an incalculable 
amount of emotional trauma, and an unimaginable amount of material damage. 
 
C. THE HIJACKERS  
Timothy Garton Ash proposes four criteria, which can be used to classify a 
terrorist: biography, goals, methods, and context.78 The goals, methods and 
context in which al-Qa’ida operates, have all been widely examined and are fairly 
well understood. Classifications such as these have has been used by the media 
to analyze the particular case of the 9/11 attacks. What is also of high interest 
and what remains to date to be essentially unexplored are the biographical facts 
surrounding the terrorists themselves. Who were these people? What made them 
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become terrorists? Why were 15 out of 19 hijackers Saudi citizens? What 
significance, if any, stands behind this fact? 
Prior to 9/11, the general profile of an Islamic suicide bomber was that of 
an uneducated, poor, psychologically troubled, young male.79 The intelligence 
collected after 9/11 suggested a possible different profile of some of the 
attackers. Most information was learned about the al-Qa’ida’s Hamburg cell in 
Germany and its head, Mohammad Atta. Atta was an Egyptian citizen who was 
born in 1968 and grew up in a religious, middle-class family in Cairo. He moved 
to Germany in 1992, where he lived for more than seven years and studied urban 
planning and preservation at the Fachhochschule Hamburg-Bergedorf. He was 
described as a serious student, a precise thinker, and one of the best students of 
the institute.80 In 2000, Atta moved to the United States to attend flight school. 
Atta, at the time of the attack, was a 33 year-old university graduate, holding a 
pilot’s license for single and twin-engine aircraft. He obviously did not exactly 
match the profile collected on previous suicide bombers, which was mostly drawn 
from Palestinian suicide bombers. However, it should be kept in mind that Atta 
was not representative of the majority of the 9/11 attackers, beginning with the 
fact that he was not a Saudi citizen. 
 The following section will focus on the available biographical data of the 
hijackers. Data have been collected from a number of sources, some of which 
are more reliable than others. Most of the data have been retrieved from publicly 
accessible CIA sources.81 Obviously, the fact that none of the hijackers’ bodies 
were identifiable after the attacks makes a positive identification difficult and 
contributes to the problem of data reliability. In this section, the hijackers are 
grouped according to their particular flights (e.g., American Airlines Flight 11), 
and the age of the hijacker (on September 11, 2001) is given in parentheses. 
Names of the 9/11 attackers written in italic font indicate that the individual was a 
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non-Saudi citizen. After giving the available biographical data, the next sections 
will analyze the information, with the goal of identifying particular patterns. 
 
American Airlines Flight 11 
 1. Al-Shehri,Wail (28)  
Wail al-Shehri was a Saudi citizen. The date of birth he used was July 31, 
1973.  Wail belonged to the Seqeley family, part of the respected southwestern 
Saudi Arabian al-Shehri tribe. He was the older brother of Waleed al-Shehri (also 
a 9/11 terrorist). The family lives in the town of Khamis Mushayt, which is located 
in Saudi Arabia’s southwest, app. 70 miles north of the Yemeni border. The al-
Shehris are a military family; three brothers are officers at a nearby Air Force 
base; the uncle, Faez al-Shehri is Major General and is the Logistical Director of 
the Royal Saudi Armed Forces. The al-Shehri family is a long-time and prominent 
merchant family with branches in Jeddah and other major cities in the kingdom.82 
His father, Mohammed Seqeley al-Shehri, owns a construction firm and did 
business with Mohammed bin Laden (father of Osama), as bin Laden’s company 
built the highway in southwestern Saudi Arabia. Wail’s father is a devout 
Wahhabi Muslim, who built the Seqeley mosque (named after his family) in 
Khamis Mushayt. He is said to be tough and uncompromising and refused his 17 
sons from four wives any link to modernity- like satellite TV, Internet, music, and 
girls (until they were old enough for an arranged marriage). 
Wail worked as a gym teacher in Khamis Mushayt. Although Wail was 
devout, he nevertheless smoked Marlboros, cruised the Internet in a local 
Internet Café, and liked pop music. In 1999, Wail became depressive to a 
suicidal degree, and was forced to take a leave of absence from his job. He and 
his brother, Waleed, then went to a faith healer in Mecca. Here, they met a 
militant Islamic cleric, who counseled them to read the Qur’an, to fast and to take 
up jihad. In the spring of 2000, he was believed to have taken a solemn oath to 
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carry out jihad. Wail al-Shehri adapted the name “Abu Mossaeb al-Janubi”, who 
was a close friend of the prophet Mohammed and who gave up everything to 
follow Mohammed’s teaching.83 
In 2000, Wail al-Shehri and his brother Waleed are believed to have spent 
time in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where they were trained in hand-to-hand 
combat and small arms.  
Wail traveled to the United States from Saudi Arabia two weeks before the 
attacks. He was a member of Osama bin Laden's al-Qa’ida terrorist network. 
Although his father claims that Wail, in December 2000, left home and work in 
order to go to the U.S. for medical treatment.  
The FBI raided a hotel in Newton, a Boston suburb, where Wail al-Shehri 
and his brother Waleed were believed to have stayed the night before the 9/11 
attacks. Possible residences in the U.S. prior to 9/11 were Hollywood, Boynton 
Beach, FL and Newton, MS. The FBI has obtained the phone records from his 
mobile phone.84  
Some believe that Wail was one of the pilots of the hijacked American 
Airlines Flight 11. However, no records exist to indicate that he ever owned a 
pilot license, attempted to acquire one, or ever even took any flying lessons at all. 
Although he was significantly older then most of the hijackers and made obvious 
attempts to become a more valuable asset to al-Qa’ida, Wail’s role in the 9/11 
attacks was probably one of a foot soldier. 
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Wail al-Shehri has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui85. 
 
 2. Al-Shehri, Waleed (22)  
Waleed was the younger brother of Wail M. al-Shehri and also a Saudi 
citizen. Waleed had used various dates of birth. The assumed age of 22 seems 
reliable, since this is in agreement with the information taken from interviews with 
his family. More questionable are the reports that he had studied at a Saudi 
Arabian teacher’s college and that he had been a former airline pilot. 
Waleed al-Shehri was described by his older brother, Abdel Rahman, as 
“drifting in life”. Waleed and Wail were not Islamists and did not live “pure” Islam. 
Both were bored with life and not particularly bright individuals. Particularly 
interesting is that their brother, Abdel Rahman, suspects that they probably had 
been unaware of what would happen to them, when they were recruited by a 
militant Islamic cleric during their trip to Mecca. Through the Seqeley mosque, 
the al-Shehri brothers became friends with Ahmed al-Nami and Saeed al-Ghamdi 
(two hijackers of United Airlines Flight 93), from the nearby town of Abha.86 
His possible residence in the U.S. is believed to have been Hollywood, 
Orlando, and/or Daytona Beach, FL.87  
Waleed al-Shehri has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui.88 His role in the 9/11 attacks can be 
categorized as one of a foot soldier. 
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  3. Al-Omari, Abdulaziz (22) 
Abdulaziz al-Omari was a Saudi citizen. He used varying dates of birth, 
but is believed to have been 22 years old at the time of the attacks.  
Abdulaziz al-Omari’s identity is questionable, since a Saudi man has 
reported to authorities that he is the real Abdulaziz al-Omari, and claims his 
passport was stolen in 1995, while he was studying electrical engineering at the 
University of Denver. Al-Omari says he informed police of the theft. "The name 
[listed by the FBI] is my name and the birth date is the same as mine, but I am 
not the one who bombed the World Trade Center in New York," Abdulaziz al-
Omari told the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper.89 Therefore, it is also 
questionable, whether al-Omari was the real identity of the hijacker pilots of 
American Airlines Flight 11, as it was reported by ABC News90.  
Al-Omari (or the individual carrying his identification) flew from Portland, 
ME, to Boston, MA (where the two flights that struck the World Trade Center 
towers originated) with Mohamed Atta, the presumed leader of the 9/11 
hijackers. A possible residence of al-Omari was Hollywood, FL.  
Abdulaziz al-Omari was listed on American Airlines Flight 11 in seat 8G. 
He has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the indictment against 
Zacarias Moussaoui.91 His role in the 9/11 attacks can be categorized as one of 
a foot soldier. 
 
 4. Al-Sugami, Satam (25)  
Except for the fact that Satam al-Sugami was a Saudi citizen, not much 
else is know about him. His identity was confirmed, because his Saudi Arabian 
passport was recovered in the rubble of the World Trade Center. The date of 
birth was June 28, 1976. 
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On American Airlines Flight 11, al-Sugami was listed as a passenger in 
seat 10B. 
The address on his Florida driver's license in Boynton Beach, FL, is the 
same as the one found on Wail al-Shehri, another hijacker on the same flight.92  
Satam al-Sugami has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui.93 His role in the 9/11 attacks can be 
categorized as one of a foot soldier. 
 
 5. Atta, Mohammad (33)  
Mohammad Atta, an Egyptian citizen, is suspected to have been the 
primary U.S. operative overseeing and directing the 9/11 attacks. He was born 
on Sept. 1, 1968, and grew up in Cairo, Egypt. When he was in his twenties, Atta 
spent most of his time in Germany, where he was a student at the technical 
university in Hamburg-Bergedorf. 
Atta did not exhibit any signs of extremism before leaving for 
Germany, but he was open with his German acquaintances about his 
dissatisfaction over Egypt's increasing Westernization, and with what he 
perceived as the Egyptian government's corruption and persecution of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Also, he made no attempt to hide his antipathy toward 
Israel. 
Atta became increasingly devout during his time in Germany and friends 
have also reported that Atta became increasingly pessimistic about his prospects 
for employment and the lack of freedom to express his religious and political 
beliefs back in Egypt. By 1997, Atta appeared to have lost contact with most of 
his German friends and was associating almost exclusively with other 
Muslims. Atta is believed to have traveled to Afghanistan for the first time in early 
1998, when he told his roommate he would be gone for two months on a 
pilgrimage. During a trip to Egypt in June, Atta applied for a new passport, even 
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though his old one had not yet expired, suggesting that he might have been 
trying to hide evidence of travel to Afghanistan. 
Atta founded the so called “Hamburg-cell”, which included Ziad Jarrad (a 
Lebanese citizen, believed to have been the hijacker pilot of United Airlines Flight 
93) and Marwn alShehhi (a United Arab Emirates citizen who has been 
suspected to have been the hijacker pilot of United Airlines Flight 175). These 
three men shared an apartment in Hamburg. They were part of a group of young 
Muslim men living in Hamburg, who came from different countries and 
backgrounds, but attended the same mosques, shared common acquaintances, 
and were drawn together by their increasingly extreme Islamist views and 
disenchantment with the West. They were intelligent, English-speaking, and 
familiar with Western society. These were traits crucial to carrying out the 9/11 
plot. They were well-suited, educated (including in technical subjects), and 
proficient in several languages-- masters at skills which would required in order 
to pilot three of the four planes on September 11. 
The general manager of a crop-dusting airfield in Florida told the FBI that 
Atta and other men visited the facility as recently as the Saturday before the 
attacks, asking questions about crop-dusting planes, including how big of a load 
of chemicals they could carry.  
In January of 2001, Atta was stopped by authorities upon re-entering the 
US from Spain, because of questions regarding his application for a change in 
visa status and in April, he was issued a court summons for driving without a 
license. Neither incident caused him to panic. 
Atta and al-Shehhi earned their private pilot licenses at an airfield in 
Venice, FL; and in December, 2000, spent thousands of dollars on jet training 
and flight simulator lessons for large commercial jets at a private flight school at 
Opa Locka, FL. 
It has been suggested that he was the same Mohamed Atta who had 
received U.S. military training (intended for members of foreign military services) 
at Norfolk Naval Air Station, VA in how to use E-2 Hawkeye radar aircraft. 
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Although Atta's father claims his son had nothing to do with the attacks, 
that he in fact hated bin Laden, and that Mohammad Atta made contact with the 
family days after the attacks; it is nevertheless fairly evident that Atta was the 
leader of the 19 hijackers and the pilot of American Airlines Flight 11, on which 
he was a passenger on seat 8D, close to Abdulaziz al-Omari. 
The FBI has obtained the phone records from his mobile phone.  
Atta's car was found abandoned at Boston's Logan Airport.  
His possible residences in the United States were Hollywood, Coral 
Springs, Venice and Nokomis, FL. 
Mohammad Atta has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui.94 
 
United Airlines Flight 175 
 6. Al-Ghamdi, Ahmed (22)  
Ahmed al-Ghamdi was a Saudi citizen from Abha, in Saudi Arabia’s 
southwest, nearby Khamis Mushayt (the home town of the al-Shehri brothers). 
Since Abha is also the home town of Hamza al-Ghamdi and Saeed al-Ghamdi, it 
is evident that they are from the same tribe. They might all be brothers, cousins, 
or cousins and brothers, although a connection has not been proven. Since 
Saeed al-Ghamdi met Wail and Waleed al-Shehri at the Seqeley mosque in the 
nearby town of Khamis Mushayt, it is very likely that all five had been friends or 
at least knew each other. Another 9/11 hijacker, Ahmed al-Nami, was also from 
the town of Abha. 
Authorities claim that al-Ghamdi was linked to Osama bin Laden's al-
Qa’ida terrorist network. He studied engineering in Mecca before moving to 
Chechnya in 1999.95 
Ahmed al-Ghamdi’s possible residences in the U.S. were Daytona Beach 
and Pensacola, FL. 
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Ahmed al-Ghamdi has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui.96 His role in the 9/11 attacks can be 
categorized as one of a foot soldier. 
 
 7. Al-Ghamdi, Hamza (20) 
Like Ahmed, 20 year-old Hamza al-Shehri (date of birth used: Nov. 18, 
1980) was a Saudi citizen from Abha. 
He prayed at the same mosques as Ahmed and had the same social 
environment. He also was linked to Osama bin Laden's al-Qa’ida terrorist 
network.97 
When he came to the United States prior to the 9/11 attacks, his possible 
residence was Delray Beach, FL. 
Hamza al-Ghamdi has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui.98 His role in the 9/11 attacks can be 
categorized as one of a foot soldier.  
 
 8. Al-Shehri, Mohand (22) 
Little is known about 22 year-old Saudi citizen Mohand al-Shehri. The 
Guardian of London reports that, like his cousin Marwan Al-Shehhi, he took flight 
training classes in Florida with Mohamed Atta.99 
His name shows that he is a member of the al-Shehri tribe, located in 
southwestern Saudi Arabia. Therefore, he probably is related and associated 
with Wail and Waleed al-Shehri from the town of Khamis Mushayt. 
Mohand Al-Shehri, who graduated from a religious high school and 
dropped out of Imam Muhammed bin Saud University, was facile enough with 
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computers that he could use the Internet at a Delray Beach public library.100 Like 
Hamza al-Ghamdi, Mohand al-Shehri possibly resided in Delray Beach, FL prior 
to the attacks.  
Mohand al-Shehri has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui.101 His role in the 9/11 attacks can be 
categorized as one of a foot soldier. 
 
 9. Al-Shehhi, Marwan (23)  
Twenty-three year-old Marwan al-Shehhi (date of birth used: May 9, 
1978), a United Arab Emirates citizen, was a cousin of Mohand al-Shehri. 
Therefore, a family or tribal connection to the brothers Wail and Waleed al-Shehri 
is highly likely. 
Marwan al-Shehhi was a roommate of Mohammad Atta’s, and Ziad 
Jarrah’s in Hamburg and a member of the “Hamburg-cell” as described earlier.  
He came to the United States from Saudi Arabia about two weeks before 
the attacks. Al-Shehhi was trained in Afghanistan in hand-to-hand combat. He 
lived as a student in Hamburg, Germany, with Mohamed Atta until the summer of 
2001, when the two moved to Florida. Investigators believe that he, along with 
Atta, paid thousands of dollars for flight-training classes in Florida, where his 
possible residence was Hollywood, FL. 
Marwan left a suicide note with his family.  
Marwan al-Shehhi has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui.102 He was the hijacker pilot of United 
Airlines Flight 175. 
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 10. Banihammad, Fayiz (24)  
Fayiz Banihammad was also a United Arab Emirates citizen. His possible 
residence in the U.S. was Delray Beach, FL. There has been no record of him 
having traveled to Afghanistan. However, it is very unlikely that he was assigned 
to the 9/11 operation without first having had an extensive hand-to-hand combat 
training. 
The address on his pilot's license was that of residence in a flight school in 
Tulsa, OK, but the school has no record of his attendance. A person with that 
name attended the Lackland Air Force Base Defense Language Institute in San 
Antonio, TX. Ahmed reportedly took flight-training classes in Florida with 
Mohamed Atta.  
Ahmed was named an unindicted co-conspirator in the indictment against 
Zacarias Moussaoui.103 It remains unclear as to whether his role in the 9/11 
attacks was as the pilot of the hijacked United Airlines Flight 175, or whether he 
was just a foot soldier. 
 
American Airlines Flight 77 
 11. Al-Mihdhar, Khalid (26) 
Since the end of the year 2000, the CIA had been aware of a man called 
Tawifiq bin Atash, known throughout bin Laden's network by his alias 'Khallad'. 
Khallad was born in Yemen and had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet 
Union, going on to become bin Laden's bodyguard and a crucial lieutenant in the 
al-Qa’ida structure: deemed too precious to die.  
According to US intelligence and federal investigators on bin Laden's trail, 
'Khallad' was the pivotal figure behind the attack on the Cole. Late in January of 
2000, he was captured on a video shot in a hotel in Malaysia, along with a group 
of men known to be part of the al-Qa’ida network. One of these men was Fahad 
al-Quso, who was assigned to shoot a film of the suicide attack on the Cole.104 
                                            
103 ABC News.Com. Who did it?  
104 Helmore, E., & Vulliamy, E. (2001, October). 2001 Saudi hijacker 'was key link to bin 
Laden'.The Observer. Retrieved October. 7, 2001, from The Observer Web Site: 
http://www.observer.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,564741,00.html.  
42 
Khalid al-Mihdhar, together with Nawaf al-Hazmi, were the only Saudi 
hijackers whom the CIA knew to have been al-Qa’ida members. Khalid al-
Mihdhar is believed to have played an important role as a planner of the attacks. 
He and Nawaf al-Hazmi had been together in Afghanistan for al-Qa’ida training. 
In November of 1999, two Saudi Arabian men moved into a ground-floor 
apartment at the Parkwood Apartments, a town house complex near a busy 
commercial strip in San Diego, CA. Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi struck 
their neighbors as odd. They had no furniture, often carried briefcases, and 
seemed to be on their cell phones a lot. Two months later, investigators believe, 
al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi traveled to Malaysia, where they met with bin Laden 
operatives (who were later linked to the bombing of the destroyer USS Cole). 
In May of 2000, Khalid arrived at Sorbi's Flying Club, a small school 20 
miles north of San Diego, that trains about four dozen pilots a year, and 
announced that he wanted to learn to fly Boeing airliners. An instructor at Sorbi's 
Flying Club in San Diego said that al-Mihdhar was interested in flying large 
planes, particularly Boeings.105 At Sorbi’s, he tried to learn to fly, but quickly had 
to abandon his efforts because of his poor technical and English-language skills.  
According to a law enforcement source, the CIA transmitted the 
information about al-Mihdhar to the FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service and his name was placed on the INS watch list. However, he had already 
entered the United States by the time his name was placed on the list, Aug. 24, 
2001. The FBI has obtained the phone records from his mobile phone.  
Newsweek reported that the FBI had begun searching for al-Mihdhar 
before the attacks. The INS reportedly checked its databases and realized that 
he, and associate Salem al-Hazmi, had entered the United States earlier in the 
year on business visas, giving a Marriott Hotel in New York as their address. The 
INS also learned the two men had entered the country in 2000 and had listed a 
Los Angeles hotel chain as their address.  
Khalid worked out at Gold’s Gym in Greenbelt, MD, together with Hani 
Hanjur and Majet Moget, for a few days in September 2001.  
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Al-Mihdhar, like al-Hazmi, was considered part of the al-Qa’ida advance 
guard.106 
Khalid al-Mihdhar was listed as a passenger on American Airlines Flight 
77 in seat 12B. 
He has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the indictment against 
Zacarias Moussaoui.107 
 
 12. Al-Hazmi, Nawaf (25) 
Nawaf al-Hazmi was a brother of Salem al-Hazmi. 
Like in the case of Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi had been in 
Afghanistan for al-Qa’ida training and the CIA knew that he was an al-Qa’ida 
member. Together with his brother, Salem, he spent time in Chechnya.  
Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar are believed to have traveled to 
Malaysia, where they met with bin Laden operatives who were later linked to the 
bombing of the destroyer USS Cole.  
As previously mentioned for Khalid al-Mihdhar, in November of 1999, 
Nawaf al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar moved into a ground-floor apartment at the 
Parkwood Apartments, a town house complex near a busy commercial strip in 
San Diego, CA. Neighbors reported their behavior as odd (although they had no 
furniture, they nevertheless were seen to always be carrying briefcases and to be 
constantly on their cell phones).  
After trying to learn to fly in May of 2000, Nawaf al-Hazmi, like Khalid al-
Mihdhar, had to abandon his efforts because of his poor technical and English-
language skills. A flight instructor at Sorbi's Flying Club in San Diego said that al-
Hazmi trained in a twin-engine Cessna with Khalid al-Mihdhar. A car dealer in 
Wayne, NJ confirmed that the FBI had confiscated his records on cars which 
Nawaf al-Hazmi had rented.108  
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Nawaf al-Hazmi is considered to have been part of the al-Qa’ida advance 
guard.109 
His possible residences in the U.S. were Fort Lee and Wayne, NJ and 
San Diego, CA. 
Nawaf al-Hazmi has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui.110 
   
 13. Al-Hazmi, Salem (20) 
Salem was a brother of Nawaf al-Hazmi. 
It seems obvious that he was inspired and/or recruited by his older brother 
Nawaf, with whom he spent time in Chechnya. 
Probably, because of his brother having been a known al-Qa’ida member, 
Salem was on a U.S. government watch list, along with Khalid al-Mihdhar, before 
the attacks. Newsweek reported that the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
checked its databases and realized that he and Al-Mihdhar entered the United 
States earlier that year (2001) on business visas, giving a Marriott Hotel in New 
York as their address. The INS also learned that the two men had entered the 
country in 2001, listing a Los Angeles hotel chain as their address. 111 Other 
possible residences of Salem al Hazmi were Fort Lee and Wayne, NJ. 
Salem was listed as a passenger of American Airlines Flight 77 in seat 5F. 
Salem al-Hazmi has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui.112 His role in the 9/11 attacks can be 
categorized as one of a foot soldier. 
  
 14. Hanjur, Hani (29)  
Hani Hanjur was a Saudi Arabian national who went to live in the United 
Arab Emirates in 1999.                                             
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According to an instructor pilot at CRM Flight School in Scottsdale, AZ, 
Hanjur received training there from September through November of 1996. 
Hanjur returned again in December of 1997. He was trying for his private pilot's 
license but, the instructor says, was a very poor student who skipped homework 
and missed flights. Nevertheless, Federal Aviation Administration records show 
that someone named Hani Hanjur received a commercial pilot's license in 1999, 
listing a P.O. Box in Saudi Arabia as his address.  
Hanjur flew three times in August of 2001 from a flight school at Freeway 
Airport in Bowie, MD. 
He worked out with Khalid al-Mihdhar and Hani Hanjur at Gold’s Gym in 
Greenbelt, MD, for a few days in September 2001.113  
His possible residences in the U.S. were Phoenix, AZ, San Diego, CA, 
and New York, NY. 
Hanjur Hani has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui.114 Hani Hanjur is the suspected hijacker 
pilot of American Airlines Flight 77. 
 
 15. Moget, Majed (24) 
Majet Moget was a Saudi citizen. He worked out with Khalid al-Mihdhar 
and Hani Hanjur at Gold’s Gym in Greenbelt, MD, for a few days in September 
2001. The FBI has obtained the phone records from his mobile phone.115 Other 
than this, not much more is known about his personal records. 
He was listed as a passenger of American Airlines Flight 77 and occupied 
seat 12A, next to Khalid al-Mihdhar. 
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Moget Majet has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the indictment 
against Zacarias Moussaoui.116 His role in the 9/11 attacks can be categorized 
as one of a foot soldier. 
 
United Airlines Flight 93 
 16. Al-Ghamdi, Saeed (20) 
Saeed al-Ghamdi was a 20 year-old Saudi citizen (date of birth listed: 
Dec. 19, 1980). 
He grew up and lived in the southwestern Saudi town of Abha (home town 
of Ahmed and Hamza al-Ghamdi), where he was friends with Ahmed al-Nami (a 
hijacker of the same airliner). Both became friends with Wail and Waleed al-
Shehri, from the neighboring town of Khamis Mushayt. Saeed al-Ghamdi and his 
friends met and prayed at Seqeley mosque in Khamis Mushayt. 
In the spring of 2000, Saeed al-Ghamdi is believed to have taken the oath 
for carrying out jihad together with his friends, Wail, Waleed al-Shehri and 
Ahmed al-Nami.117 
In the United States, his possible residences were Daytona Beach and 
Pensacola, FL.118  
Saeed al-Ghamdi has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui.119 His role in the 9/11 attacks can be 
categorized as one of a foot soldier. 
  
 17. Al-Haznawi, Ahmed (20) 
Little is known about the 20 year-old (date of birth used: Oct. 11, 1980) 
Saudi citizen Ahmed al-Haznawi. His possible residence in the United States was 
Delray Beach, FL. 
                                            
116 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (2001, December 1). 
United States versus Zacarias Moussaoui.  
117 Sennott, C. M., (p. 25). 
118 ABC News.Com. Who did it?  
119 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (2001, December 1). 
United States versus Zacarias Moussaoui.  
47 
Ahmed al-Haznawi has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui.120 His role in the 9/11 attacks can be 
categorized as one of a foot soldier. 
 
 18. Al-Nami, Ahmed (23) 
Twenty-three year-old (date of birth used: December 1977) Ahmed al-
Nami, a Saudi citizen from the southwestern town of Abha (the home town of 
Ahmed, Hamza, and Saeed al-Ghamdi) grew up in a distinctly middle-class 
family. His deceased father had been an employee of the Ministry of Islamic 
Affairs and Endowment. Ahmed al-Nami was the youngest of six siblings. During 
his high school years, he was a social type, who would spend time with his 
friends playing guitar, singing at bonfires, and smoking apple tobacco from a 
water pipe. His behavior as a school kid was viewed by his family as being un-
Islamic. 
Ahmed al-Nami dramatically changed during a state-sponsored religious 
summer camp in 1999. He grew a beard, distanced himself from his friends, 
stopped playing music, and changed to a degree that his family had suspected 
bipolar disorder. He usually prayed at al-Basra mosque in Abha, but he also 
attended Seqeley mosque in Khamis Mushayt, where he met Wail and Waleed 
al-Shehri. He entered King Khalid University’s School of Islamic Law, where he 
was suspected to have been drawn into militant Islamic circles.121 
His efforts to stop his high school friends’ evil practices and to convince 
them of the true path of Islam indicated that by that time, he considered himself 
being on a “mission”. 
In 2000, Ahmed al-Nami made his oath to commit to jihad together with 
his friends Wail, Waleed al-Shehri and Saeed al-Ghamdi.122 
His possible residence in the United States was Delray Beach, FL.123  
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Ahmed al-Nami has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui.124 His role in the 9/11 attacks can be 
categorized as one of a foot soldier. 
 
 19. Jarrah, Ziad (26)  
Twenty-six  year-old Ziad Jarrah was a Lebanese citizen. 
From 1996 to 2000, he studied aeronautical engineering in Hamburg, 
Germany. Jarrah shared an apartment in Hamburg with Mohammad Atta and 
Marwan al-Shehhi and was a member of the “Hamburg-cell”, which has been 
described earlier. 
Jarrah left Germany for the first time in June of 2000, traveling to the 
United States briefly to attend an aviation seminar sponsored by Boeing. He 
returned to the United States again about six months before the attacks. About 
10 days before the attacks, he called his father asking for $2,000, and then called 
back two days later to thank him. Jarrah's father and uncle both said he was not 
a religious man and denied a CNN report stating that he had been to 
Afghanistan.125 He was listed as having a valid pilot's license. Hours after the 
attacks, the FBI searched an apartment in Hollywood, FL, in which he was 
thought to have lived.  
Ziad Jarrah has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui.126 It is obvious that he was the hijacker 
pilot of United Airlines Flight 93. 
 The next section will consist of an analysis of this biographical data, with 
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D. INTERPRETATION OF THE DATA ON THE 15 SAUDIS 
Although there is a scarcity of biographical data and what is available may 
be, in some cases, not entirely reliable, certain patterns can be seen in the 
profiles, and similar characteristics which are shared by the various hijackers can 
be observed. Some of the individual points may, at first glance, appear to be 
trivial; however, when the data is pooled and looked at as a whole, it leads to 
certain assumptions which will later be used to support the conclusions. 
First of all, it is clear that, on at least three of the four planes, only a single 
hijacker knew how to fly a plane. Three of the hijacker pilots, Mohammad Atta, 
Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah, were non-Saudi nationals. The only Saudi 
hijacker pilot was Hani Hanjur. Just two of the other hijackers, Wail al-Shehri and 
Mohand al-Shehri, made serious attempts to learn how to fly a commercial 
airliner. Two others, Khalid al-Mhihdar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, also made brief 
attempts at flying lessons, but had to quit due to lack of personal capabilities. 
The 15 Saudi hijackers were all relatively young. Their ages ranged 
between 20 and 26 years (with the exception of two, Wail al-Shehri, 28, and Hani 
Hanjur, 29). They were all Sunni Muslims. All of them were in a stage of life, 
where they had finished their school education and were either starting 
professional careers or in universities. Although a few attended local universities, 
most of the Saudi hijackers can be described as having been less educated. 
Those who entered the “work force”127 were not very ambitious; neither did they 
have prestigious jobs or professional successes. Some even suffered from 
depression or were described as “drifting in life”, one was described by others as 
having a “suicidal mood”. They were still looking for their “mission” in life. 
Those whose origins are known came from tribes of Saudi Arabia’s 
southwestern region between the Red Sea and Yemen, called Tihama. This 
region is one of the poorest and least developed regions in Saudi Arabia. The 
tribes of this region are traditionally known to be not very loyal to the House of 
Saud. The local clerics are not part of the Wahhabi clerics’ establishment, which 
 House of Saud (leading clerics are appointed by the is strongly connected to the                                            
127 Working Saudi citizens are mainly employed by the government (about 85%). Manual 
work or service-related labor is overwhelmingly done by foreign workers. 
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king). The local “second-line” clerics are known to be more fundamental and 
proclaim an even more pure form of Islam. Therefore, these are the clerics who 
most often critique the Saudi monarchs. 
There is no common pattern in the social background of the 15 Saudis. 
The al-Shehri brothers came from a very rich and well-respected family. Ahmed 
al-Nami came from a middle-class family. Others, with tribe names of the Saudi 
southwestern region, probably came from poorer families.  
However, coming from “normal” families, i.e.; those with no obvious 
connections to radical or dissident groups, the men blended easily into the 
stream of thousands of Saudi visa applicants who pass through the U.S. 
Embassy in Riyadh or the Jiddah consulate each year. 
None of the 15 Saudis were known to have been long-term Islamic 
fundamentalists or even very religious. It was only within the year (or two) prior to 
the attacks, that they became religious, adopting the idea of militant Islam. They 
wanted to contribute to the Muslim cause and developed the desire to participate 
in jihad.  
Many of the 15 Saudis had family relations with each other. Even more 
knew each other prior to becoming al-Qa’ida operatives, from praying in the 
same mosque (Seqeley mosque in Khamis Mushayt, or the mosque in Abha). At 
least eight of the hijackers (Ahmed al-Ghamdi, Hamza al-Ghamdi, Saeed al-
Ghamdi, Ahmed al-Nami, Marwan al-Shehhi, Mohand al-Shehri Wail al-Shehri, 
and Waleed al-Shehri) had family ties, and/or had been friends with each other. 
These initial contacts were the starting point which led to the spiral of 
events in which the group of young, bored, ambitionless, and unsuccessful Saudi 
youths found new goals and fulfillment in life. Through their newly-developed 
religious beliefs, they came into contact with militant Islamic clerics.  This led to 
their being recruited for Islamic jihad in Chechnya, their departure to Afghanistan 
in order to acquire training for jihad, and finally to their selection for carrying out 
the 9/11 attacks. These developments occurred rapidly and resulted in 
separation from their families. This radicalization developed, in most cases, 
within a time frame of two years or less. 
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The young Saudis (with the exception of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Hani 
Hanjur) first became involved with al-Qa’ida only in the late 1990’s. Most went to 
Afghanistan for the first time in 1999 or 2000. The CIA believes that they did not 
become involved in the 9/11 plot until late 2000.128 It is further believed that al-
Qa’ida leadership did not want them to know anything about the attacks earlier 
than necessary. They may not even have known the overall nature of the mission 
at all. They left only minimal traces in U.S. public records and seem, for the most 
part, to have arrived in the U.S. only a few months prior to the attacks.129 
Only two of them, Hani Hanjur (29) and Khalid al-Mihdhar (26), can be 
considered as core al-Qa’ida members and are suspected of having been 
planners of the operation. Hanjur was a presumed pilot of American Airlines’ 
Flight 77. Khalid al-Mihdhar was a known al-Qa’ida operative, who had been 
involved in previous al-Qa’ida operations. 
 
E. HOW WELL DO THE YOUNG SAUDIS MATCH THE CONCEPT OF THE 
ISLAMIC TERRORIST? 
With the exception of Hani Hanjur and Khalid al-Mihdhar, the other Saudi 
hijackers were all short-term al-Qa’ida members and can be considered as the 
foot soldiers of the operation. As foot soldiers, they were responsible for carrying 
out the orders, but were not involved in the planning or provided with operational 
details. In fact, it is highly likely that they might not have even been aware of the 
intentions to deliberately crash the planes.  
 When we compare the characteristics of the 15 Saudis to those models of 
militant Islam and the Islamic terrorist (as described in chapter II), it becomes 
evident that although the 15 Saudis fit in some ways the model of an Islamic 
terrorist, they also deviate significantly in certain ways from that model.  
For example, a theme which they had in common with Islamic terrorism 
Islam from global modernization and secularism and was their desire to defend 
                                            128 Tenet, George J. (June 18, 2002). Unclassified Version of Director of Central Intelligence 
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129 Goldstein, A. (2001). 
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return to a society based only on religious grounds. They interpreted Islam in a 
fundamental way and became familiar with the idea of militant Islam. Ideologies 
like Sayyid Qutb’s radical interpretation of Islam created a mindset that allowed 
them to reject all other laws except the law of God, and indoctrinated them to 
unconditionally accept “God’s word”. Therefore, it was easy for an Islamic 
terrorist organization like al-Qa’ida to manipulate these young men, who saw no 
problem with breaking the laws of others, since all that counted was that they 
obeyed the laws of God. 
In addition, the 15 Saudis were similar to the general picture painted of 
other Islamic terrorists in their age and stage of life. They were young adults, not 
yet established in their careers or families. 
The situation of the 15 Saudis differs from the “norm” of Islamic terrorism 
in the degree of access to Western education. That is, whereas the Islamic 
terrorist is generally one who has been educated in the West, this was not true 
for the 15 Saudis. Most Islamic terrorists become caught between the values 
gained from their secular Western education and traditional Islamic values. The 
15 Saudis, on the other hand, were not educated in the West and had all been 
raised as Sunni Muslim and only shortly prior to the attacks developed a strong 
desire to return to the pure Islam. They were, in their personal lives, in situations 
of indifference, they lacked rewarding career opportunities and had not found a 
“mission” or goal in life. The Muslim cause seemed to be something worth 
dedicating to. They had known men, either through family ties or through friends, 
who fought for the Muslim cause; and this served to encourage the young Saudis 
to do the same. Once they became convinced that jihad meant a violent fight 
against the enemies of Islam, the wish to fight in Chechnya in order to liberate 
their Muslim brothers from infidel oppression was the next logical step. 
From this point, the 15 Saudis shared additional characteristics with other 
Islamic terrorists in that they prepared for “their” jihad by finding the “true”, “pure” 
Islam. They left behind their social environments and concentrated solely on 
becoming better Muslims. The second step in their preparation was a physical 
one; they went to Afghanistan in order to acquire the necessary skills for fighting 
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the liberation war in Chechnya. Here in Afghanistan, they joined training camps 
run by al-Qa’ida. 
At this point, they became caught up in the machinery of al-Qa’ida and (as 
supported by the example of the recruitment of Mohammed Mansour Jabarah) 
were manipulated into fighting for al-Qa’ida’s objectives instead of fighting for 
their own cause of contributing to the liberation of their Muslim brothers from 
Russian oppression in Chechnya. Although al-Qa’ida certainly supported the fight 
of Chechen Muslims against Russia, the 15 Saudis were tasked on a mission, 
which ideologically fitted Osama bin Laden’s fatwa from 1998130, in which he 
proclaimed that to kill Americans wherever there is a chance is every Muslim’s 
duty. This certainly did not fit the original motives of the 15 Saudis to join militant 
Islam. Therefore, the 15 Saudis ended up as being political pawns for al-Qa’ida’s 
objectives. 
And finally, a last way in which the case of the 15 Saudis differs from the 
concept of Islamic terrorism is in the degree of dedication.  Whereas most Islamic 
terrorists are fully aware of the potential consequences to their lives when they 
dedicate to jihad, there is good reason to think this may have not been the case 
for the 15 Saudis. Palestinian Hamas or Hezbollah suicide attackers often leave 
behind a video-taped statement on their intentions to sacrifice their lives in the 
name of Allah. This was not done by the 9/11 attackers (it should be noted 
however, that this does not necessarily prove that they were not aware of the 
suicidal nature of their missions, as it is also possible that videos were made but 
later covered up by al-Qa’ida operatives). It is certainly questionable, whether the 
Saudis possessed dedication over and beyond their commitments to jihad, 
whether or not they were indeed committed to sacrificing their lives in the name 
of Allah.  
 In summary, the first section of this chapter provided a profile on Osama 
bin Laden and an introduction into the workings of his terrorist network, al-Qa’ida. 
The picture presented is that of a man who came from a very wealthy family and, 
as a young adult, enjoyed many of the “sins” of Western societies. Later in life, 
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he became disenchanted with the continual presence of the West in the Middle 
East, and began to use Islamic fundamentalism as a tool for recruiting individuals 
willing to perform acts of terror to accomplish their goal of ridding the Middle East 
of all Western presences. The al-Qa’ida network grew out of this, and although 
the network had never been particularly successful in accomplishing their goal; 
on September 11, 2001, they carried out an attack of such atrocity that it got the 
attention of the entire world. The sequence of events that occurred on this fatal 
day was then described in the next section (Section B.). In Section C., a closer 
examination of each of the hijackers was conducted, with a profile listing 
available biographical data on each man. This was followed by an analysis of the 
data in which commonalities were identified (Section D.), which were then 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Although the case of the 15 Saudis shares common themes with the 
concept of Islamic terrorism (as discussed in Chapters II and III); the young 
Saudis do not fit all of the characteristics of an Islamic suicide terrorist. Like many 
other Islamic terrorists, they all committed themselves to jihad and wanted to 
fight for the Muslim cause in Chechnya. However, after being recruited by al-
Qa’ida, they unknowingly became martyrs for a completely different cause. Most 
of them were too young and inexperienced, too instable, and too lacking in self 
confidence to counteract the process by which their religious ideals were 
transformed into militancy. The majority (except Khalid al-Mihdhar and Hani 
Hanjur) cannot be considered as having been hard-line, ideological, steadfast al-
Qa’ida members, but rather as young Muslims, who had recently found the path 
of pure Islam and who were caught and drawn into militant Islam in order to 
function as the so called “muscle” of terror acts. In short, they were political 
pawns for al-Qa’ida’s objectives. 
There were a few pragmatic considerations that were likely taken into 
consideration by al-Qa’ida when they decided to focus on the recruitment of 
Saudis for the 9/11 attacks. First of all, since the mission would require traveling 
between the Middle East and the U.S, it made sense to select Saudis. That is, it 
is not uncommon for wealthy Saudis to travel to the U.S. (often on shopping 
sprees) and therefore, Saudis who travel are considered less suspicious than 
citizens from most of the other Middle Eastern states. Secondly, the fact that the 
southwestern region of Saudi Arabia is poor, remote and close to Yemen makes 
it a spot in which it is easy to recruit. 
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 Besides these pragmatic considerations, it is also likely that al-Qa’ida had 
even more sinister secondary motives when they selectively chose Saudis to 
carry out their acts. One possible motive is that they wished to increase the 
internal tensions inside Saudi Arabia. The tribes of the poor Saudi Southwest 
near the Yemeni border are traditionally critical over the House of Saud. 
Therefore, the selection of recruits from these particular tribes from this region 
would be likely to spur up additional opposition to the monarchs, help to raise 
internal tensions, and ultimately rid the al Saud monarchs.  
In addition to punishing the U.S. for her policy towards the Middle East, a 
second motive behind the 9/11 attacks is likely to have been to drive a wedge 
between the U.S.-Saudi relations. Al-Qa’ida probably had calculated that the 
selection of Saudi citizens as hijackers would lead to U.S. suspicion that Saudi 
Arabia is a breeding ground for terrorists and therefore, damage the U.S. – Saudi 
relations. Already long before September 11, 2001, there had been several 
sources of friction which troubled the U.S.-Saudi relation. The U.S. was 
concerned over the lack of political and civil rights, religious freedom, and 
transparency in the Saudi justice system; as well as her self-interested dictation 
of oil prizes, the inadequate position towards Taliban, her attempts to procure 
WMD, and the widespread and governmental-supported anti-Semitism. These 
points of critique were all tolerated since Saudi Arabia proved to be a reliable ally 
during the first Gulf War in 1991. If this was one of the goals of the 9/11 attacks, 
then it should be noted that al Qa’ida was indeed partially successful. Since the 
attack, there have been strong critiques of Saudi Arabia’s cooperation and 
discussions about Saudi Arabia’s reliability as an ally in the war on terrorism131. 
There is no doubt that the 15-out-of-19-fact has stressed U.S. tolerance and 
caused increased tensions in the relations with Saudi Arabia. After the recent 
Riyadh bombings in May 2003,132 the discussion about Saudi Arabia’s credibility 
was stirred up once again. 
However, the evidence provided in this paper, which has been derived 
from a closer examination into the backgrounds of the Saudi hijackers, does not 
support the theory that Saudi Arabia is a breeding ground for terrorists. In fact, it 
can even be argued that it contradicts this thesis. That is, each of the Saudi 
hijackers left his social environment and entered an environment of militant Islam 
only once he was outside of Saudi society, and most of the men were even 
                                            
131 A further example can be found in the testimonies before the House International 
Relations Committee, May 22, 2002. 
132 On May 12, 2003, Islamic terrorists stormed a living compound for foreigners in Riyadh, 
causing the deaths of 34 people, including 7 Saudis, 8 Americans and 19 other foreigners. 
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further indoctrinated outside of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s society is a 
religiously homogeneous society (100% of Saudi citizens are Muslim) and the 
Wahhabi branch of Islam dominates the society. Since the Wahhabi sect, on the 
spectrum of all branches of Islam, promotes a very pure, and in a way, extreme 
form of Islam, this certainly facilitates the recruitment of young men for militant 
Islam, but does not necessarily promote militant Islam. Islamic terrorist 
organizations do have a broad range of immature believers to choose from for 
their operatives and the strong beliefs of the immature believers can be exploited 
to serve the terrorists’ cause. But it is not the society itself which should be 
blamed for creating the terrorist or for promoting Islamic terrorism. 
The 15 Saudis which committed the atrocious acts of 9/11 had been 
essentially caught up in a machinery, one which exploited their willingness to 
participate in jihad in order to support the liberation of their fellow Muslims in 
Chechnya. These men who were committed to jihad were exploited for the 
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